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El papel de la voluntad en la teoría de Hannah Arendt sobre los 
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ABSTRACT Hannah Arendt’s work is notably ambiguous in handling 
the concept of will. On the one hand, willing appears as an anti-political 
faculty; on the other, it is named as the spring of political action. This 
paper asks what does this shift mean to her political theory —hoping 
that it could also help us to think our current political conflicts. The 
main argument is that will’s consistency with the plurality of public-
political life becomes intelligible only if we have in mind its contentious 
feature as well as its bonding role among the several faculties that 
compose a multiple self. However, the anti-political notion of the will 
as a command that imposes itself as a sovereign decision seems hard 
to avoid. I conclude by suggesting that Arendt’s reappraisal removes 
its arbitrary and violent character by means of what she calls the 
transformation of will into love. 
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RESUMEN La obra de Hannah Arendt es notablemente ambigua en el 
manejo del concepto de voluntad. Por un lado, la voluntad aparece como una 
facultad antipolítica; por el otro, es nombrada como la fuente de la acción 
política. Este artículo pregunta qué significa este cambio para su teoría 
política, con la esperanza de que esto también nos ayude a pensar nuestros 
conflictos políticos actuales. El argumento principal es que la coherencia de la 
voluntad con la pluralidad de la vida político-pública sólo se hace inteligible 
si tenemos en mente su carácter contencioso y además su papel de vinculación 
entre las diversas facultades que componen un múltiple self. Sin embargo, la 
noción antipolítica de la voluntad como un comando que se impone tal cual 
una decisión soberana parece difícil de evitar. Concluyo sugiriendo que la 
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lo que ella llama la transformación de la voluntad en amor. 
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The Role of The Will in Hannah Arendt’s Theory on Political Conflicts
The reading presented here follows the agonistic interpretations 
of Hannah Arendt. I do not take hers as a theory of democratic 
deliberation toward consensus, but as a political theory in which the 
possibility to argue, to dissent, to disobey, to transgress, to resist, and 
even to conflict all play a crucial role. Every agreement is accompanied 
by the possibility to disagree.1 We can only truly say ‘yes’ when we could 
likewise say ‘no’. In this possibility, in this contingency, therefore, 
freedom and politics —“two sides of the same matter” (Arendt, 
1961/2006, p. 147)— find its groundwork. In other words, the raison 
d’etre of politics is the freedom to do or not do.
With that said, my goal is to examine the concept of will in Arendt’s 
political theory. In several of her writings, willing appears as an anti-
political faculty, which is manifest in at least three directions: the 
worldlessness of a spiritual faculty which takes men out of the common 
reality to throw them inside themselves; a tendency to homogenize, 
eliminating differences; and the fact that the will imposes itself in 
the public sphere as a sovereign decision. But willing has also another 
aspect in her work. At the end of her life, Arendt was engaged in an 
extensive research on the faculties of mind. The chapter on “Willing” 
in The Life of the Mind is the last she was able to write before her death. 
At that moment, the will was not opposed to politics anymore; rather, it 
was named as “the spring of action” (Arendt, 1978, p. 6).
What does this shift mean to the relation between the faculty of 
the will and the possibility of political conflicts? Is this really a shift in 
Arendt’s thought on will? How does this happen? After all, how is the 
will related to the human capacity to act and to start something new, 
that is, to the exercise of freedom? What about the other faculties of the 
mind? These are questions to be thought about in this paper. It starts 
by briefly presenting the intricate critique of sovereign will in two of 
her major works: Origins of Totalitarianism and The Human Condition. 
Then it shows the ambiguity in the treatment of this subject matter 
in a peculiar essay written by her in the mid-fifties, On the nature of 
totalitarianism. This is the ambiguity between the will as an inward, thus 
anti-political faculty and, otherwise, the will to act in a public sphere. 
1 “Dissent implies consent, and is the hallmark of free government; one who knows that he may 





But this is also the duality between an inner freedom, experienced by a 
person with oneself, and the experience of public or political freedom. 
Thereafter, I intend to show how philosophers, in Arendt’s 
account, were unable to deal with freedom. At this point it is imperative 
to compare an essay named What is Freedom?, written by her half a 
decade after the one on totalitarianism, and the chapter on Willing in 
The Life of Mind. In both writings the guiding question and the authors 
called upon to provide answers are quite similar, but the outcomes are 
strikingly distinct. While in the former Arendt dispenses with its dual 
nature in order to present an image of the will as strictly anti-political 
and restrict to inner life, in the latter the link between will and political 
freedom is highlighted. My assumption is that Arendt’s equivocal 
position on will depends on her standpoint, that is, whether she is 
thinking along with philosophers or men of action. The displacement 
between these points of view results in two different but slightly 
discerned concepts: the will-to-power and the will-to-act.
Arendt’s twists around the will reveals a genuine and intricate 
problem, which is handled in The Life of the Mind through a more 
meticulous investigation on the link between will, action and freedom. 
We must then be able to note whether all the anti-political features 
of will have been somehow reversed, forgotten or transformed in 
her late thought, and what this could mean to her theory on political 
conflicts. I assume that in this undeclared review Arendt is not denying 
that willing is experienced in inner life, though this is no longer the 
experience of a lonely and sovereign subject. What is anti-political in 
the faculties of the mind is the illusion of a solipsistic self, which results 
in the onslaught of a philosopher-king, a sovereign will, or a supreme 
judge over the public-political sphere. On the contrary, when will is 
considered close to action, consistent with the plurality of public-
political life, it is understood as the experience of a multiple “self”. 
However, the problem of decision does persist, whether we think of the 
personal or the collective will. I conclude by suggesting that Arendt's 
reappraisal of will as a faculty consistent with the political experience, 
though it cannot transform it into a democratic deliberation, removes 
its arbitrary and violent character by means of what she calls the 
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The Critique of Sovereign Will
Hannah Arendt’s approach on will as an anti-political faculty cannot 
be fully understood apart from her critique of sovereignty. In her 
first book, Origins of Totalitarianism, there is a manifold and tortuous 
approach on the subject. Although the state —either in a republic 
or in a monarchy— had as its primary function the protection of all 
inhabitants in its territory, it was forced “in the name of the will of 
the people” to guarantee full citizenship only for nationals, that is, 
“those who belonged to the national community by right of origin and 
fact of birth”. Curiously, nationalism was cemented by the decline of 
another form of sovereignty: the enlightened despotism. Hence, being 
born and raised upon the same soil became the “only remaining bond 
between the citizens of a nation-state without a monarch to symbolize 
their essential community” (Arendt, 1951/1985, p. 230). 
With its laws transformed into an instrument of the nation, 
subdued to something that romantics called the “national soul”, state 
sovereignty was then “surrounded by a pseudo-mystical aura of lawless 
arbitrariness” (1951/1985, p. 231). Otherwise, while they were linked 
to a territory that was a permanent home for a people with common 
historical and cultural background, national laws served as a dam that 
contained imperialist enterprises. That is precisely where its difference 
towards the nationalism of tribal movements lies. Considering the pan-
movements as forerunners of the totalitarian contempt for law, Arendt 
affirms that since they have arisen in places where there have never been 
constitutional governments, it was just natural that power was conceived 
as arbitrary decisions. “In its complete arbitrariness, power as such was 
held to be holy […]. The government, no matter what it did, was still the 
‘Supreme Power in action’, and the movement only had to adhere to this 
power and to organize its popular support, […] a colossal herd, obedient 
to the arbitrary will of one man” (1951/1985, p. 248). 
This Supreme Power, still according to the complex analysis 
provided in the book, was foretold by the ingenuity of Thomas Hobbes, 
whose philosophy of power resulted in a political theory that has 





of the nation-state2 became an issue only in twentieth-century, when 
an unprecedented flux of stateless individuals forced the nation-states 
to use their “sovereign right of expulsion” (1951/1985, p. 283). It turns 
out that the new sovereign became also a tyrant. Human rights were 
then evoked as a safeguard. But this shield has proved inadequate since 
the abstract Man could not be found anywhere. In fact, the rights of 
the individual depended on the emancipation of the people, that is, 
they were linked to the fact of living and belonging to an independent 
nation. So the paradox of human rights was that only an emancipated 
sovereign people was able to guarantee them. “[The] people, and not 
the individual, was the image of man” (1951/1985, p. 291).
In its ultimate form, sovereignty intends to command and 
regulate every aspect of human life, even those that belong to “the 
dark background of mere giveness, the background formed by our 
unchangeable and unique nature”, that is, all that is “mysteriously 
given us by birth”. This mere existence, as the mere existence of an 
“alien” seen “in its all too obvious difference”, should remind us of “the 
limitations of human activity”, indicating those things that “men cannot 
change at will” (1951/1985, p. 301). In other words, it must remind 
us those domains where nobody is sovereign. Instead, a tendency to 
homogenize leads to nullify, cast out or even to destroy all differences. 
Some years later, in The Human Condition, the Promethean feature of 
sovereignty is labeled with the absolute freedom of an individual able 
to do whatever one wants, without restrictions or commitments, that 
is, considering only one’s own will. This kind of freedom, Arendt says, 
does not exist in the public realm.3
2 Bonnie Honig calls it the paradox of politics, depicting it as follows: “Popular sovereignty is 
supposed to solve the problems of (il)legitimacy and arbitrariness. But once the people have 
power, that ‘solution’ suddenly looks like a problem, for the people, too, can be a source of 
arbitrariness” (Honig, 2001, p. 19). The departing point of her analysis is Rousseau’s General 
Will, and her brilliant insight is to discuss this problem under the figure of the foreign-
founder. See also her essay on decision and deliberation (Honig, 2007), whose conclusion 
inspires —perhaps in a skewed way— my reading of Arendt’s reappraisal of the will in The Life 
of the Mind.
3 “If it were true that sovereignty and freedom are the same, then indeed no man could be 
free, because sovereignty, the ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership, is 
contradictory to the very condition of plurality. No man can be sovereign because not one man, 
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Still, there is another standpoint. Arendt uses the same term to 
describe the strength of the promises that keeps a community united. 
“Sovereignty”, she states, “which is always spurious if claimed by an 
isolated single entity, be it the individual entity of the person or the 
collective entity of a nation, assumes, in the case of many men mutually 
bound by promises, a certain limited reality. The sovereignty resides 
in the resulting, limited independence from the incalculability of 
the future” (Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 245). Looking to the future as if it 
were present, committing ourselves to keep and remember today’s 
feats in the days to come, we become, to some extent, sovereigns over 
time. In this way, men are bonded together not, she stresses, “by an 
identical will which somehow magically inspires them all, but by an 
agreed purpose for which alone the promises are valid and binding” 
(1958/1998, p. 245). The strength of the promises does not come from 
inside, as an impulse or instinct that forces us to keep our words; but 
it rather arises from the commitment to something common to all 
partners, something that lies among them.
In this context, it seems that Arendt recovers the political 
relevance of a specific notion of sovereignty, keeping will —as the 
impulse or the command that each one feels inside oneself, or that is 
imposed to all by a single entity— apart from the public and political 
realm. Nonetheless, the concept of will is also revisited. She recalls 
Nietzsche’s account on promise as the “memory of the will”, besides 
stating that promising and forgiving are the only “moral precepts 
[...] that are not applied to action from the outside”; rather they arise 
“directly out of the will to live together with others in the mode of acting 
and speaking” (1958/1998, p. 246). In another passage, she links the 
heroic character —that serves as model for the political agent— to “a 
willingness to act and speak at all, to insert one’s self into the world 
and begin a story of one’s own”; a sort of “courage, without which [...] 
freedom, would not be possible at all” (1958/1998, pp. 186-187). Thus, 
the concept of sovereign will is marked by an astonishing ambiguity 





The Will’s Dual Nature
The ambiguity in Arendt’s critique of sovereign will has a peculiar form 
in a sequence of her essays written in 1954 concerning the nature of 
totalitarianism and the difficulties to understand it. In one of these 
essays —as also in the chapter on ideology and terror added to Origins 
of Totalitarianism in the previous year— she resorts to Montesquieu in 
order to consider the novelty of the totalitarian form of government. 
Following the tradition of political thought, Montesquieu sustained that 
a sovereign power is exercised in all three forms of government known 
by then: the republic, the monarchy, and the tyranny. In the first two, 
the sovereign power lies in the hands of the people and in the hands 
of just one man, respectively, but in both cases it does respond to and 
it is limited by law. For the republic is “a constitutional government”, 
and the monarchy is “a lawful government”. Only tyrannies dispense 
with the law, for its “power is exercised by one man according to his 
arbitrary will” (Arendt, 2005, p. 330).
Therefore, though he is well-known for his theory on the division 
of powers, one does not find in Montesquieu a critique of sovereignty 
itself. It is Kant, says Arendt, who carries it on through the distinction 
between forms of domination and forms of government. The former, 
in which an “undivided sovereign power” rules, are regarded as illegal 
whether the power is in the hands of the prince, of a class of nobles, 
or of the people taken as one single subject. “Constitutional or lawful 
government is established through the division of power so that the 
same body (or man) does not make the laws, execute them, and then sit 
in judgment on itself” (2005, p. 330).
But one does find in Montesquieu, or at least in Arendt’s reading 
of his work, a critique of sovereign will. This is not only seen in his 
description of tyranny as the command of an arbitrary will, but also in 
the very fact that his search for the principles of political action is not 
the scrutiny of inner motives and goals, appetites or desires, that is, it 
does not aim man as an individual, but as a citizen in a public world. The 
discrepancy between man and citizen reveals the impartial character of 
law, and shows the limits of legal governments: they cannot interfere 
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problem aroused by this discrepancy is that “the very standards of right 
and wrong in the two spheres are not the same and are often even in 
conflict” (2005, p. 334). Conflicts, she continues, that seem insoluble. 
Nonetheless, Montesquieu’s principles of action show that 
“there must be some underlying ground from which both man as an 
individual and man as a citizen sprang”, which means that “there 
was more to the dilemma of the personal and the public spheres than 
discrepancy and conflict, even though they might conflict” (2005, p. 
335). Montesquieu adds a new question to the traditional inquiry on the 
nature of government: “What makes a government act as it acts?” The 
answer is that beyond each political structure there is also a principle 
that sets it in motion. The principle of action in a republic is virtue, in 
a monarchy it is honor, and in a tyranny, fear.
Each of these principles arise from “authentic elements of the 
human condition and are reflected in primary human experiences” 
(2005, p. 338). Virtue is the experience of equality between men, 
honor is the experience of distinction, and fear ―whose outlines are 
not sketched by Montesquieu himself― is the experience in which man 
cannot be equaled to nor distinguished from other men, that is, the 
experience of loneliness. Insofar as action is always action in concert, 
“fear as a principle of action is in some sense a contradiction in terms, 
because fear is precisely despair over the impossibility of action”. 
Hence, it is in fact an anti-political principle. In a detour of Karl Marx’s 
famous sentence, she writes that fear “can only be destructive”, and 
tyranny “is therefore the only form of government which bears germs 
of its destruction within itself” (2005, p. 337).
It is also noteworthy the link between lawlessness, fear, 
loneliness, impotence, violence, domination, and the will to power.
Out of the conviction of one's own impotence and the fear of 
the power of all others comes the will to dominate, which is the 
will of the tyrant. Just as virtue is love of the equality of power, 
so fear is actually the will to, or, in its perverted form, lust for 
power. Concretely and politically speaking, there is no other 
will to power but the will to dominate. For power itself in its true 





it were, into being whenever men act ‘in concert’ and disappears 
not less mysteriously, whenever one man is all by himself. 
Tyranny, based on the essential impotence of all men who are 
alone, is the hubristic attempt to be like God, invested with 
power individually, in complete solitude. (2005, pp. 337-338).
Thus, tyranny is the violent and arbitrary command of a person 
whose impotence, that is, the fact that he is by himself, leads to the will 
to dominate. Nevertheless, totalitarian power, the new phenomenon 
that needs to be examined in its novelty, is not exercised by a tyrannical 
will. Arendt is careful enough to say that totalitarian rule is not 
arbitrary. In fact, “it obeys with strict logic and executes with precise 
compulsion the laws of History or Nature”, that is, a “higher form of 
legitimacy” (2005, p. 339-340). But if law is what prevents a sovereign 
will to impose itself upon all the others, the enforcement of a Law of 
laws directly upon men is the suppression of all and any will, which is 
also the suppression of freedom.
The traditional concept of law provides men with some relative 
permanence and stability, inasmuch as the source of its authority 
—a supreme law— is situated out of time and never shows up to the 
contingent and mutable sphere of human affairs. It does stabilize the 
world in order to allow men to move within it. In turn, totalitarian laws 
become laws of movement, the movement of Nature and History, while 
men are immobilized.
If law, therefore, is the essence of constitutional or republican 
government, then terror is the essence of totalitarian 
government. Laws were established to be boundaries […] and 
to remain static, enabling men to move within them; under 
totalitarian conditions, on the contrary, every means is taken 
to ‘stabilize’ men, to make them static, in order to prevent any 
unforeseen, free, or spontaneous acts that might hinder freely 
racing terror. […] no free action of mere men is permitted to 
interfere with it. Guilt and innocence become meaningless 
categories; ‘guilty’ is he who stands in the path of terror, that is, 
who willingly or unwillingly hinders the movement of Nature or 
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Willingly or unwillingly… In totalitarian regimes, being guilty is 
not related to any deed or will to act in a way or another. One is born 
guilty or innocent by the simple fact of being what he or she is. From the 
point of view of superhuman laws, not only the command of a sovereign 
but also the very human capacity to act and to start something new seems 
to be arbitrary and meaningless. That is why in a perfect totalitarian 
government no principle of action is required. In turn, it is moved by 
a “new principle, which, as such, dispenses with human action as free 
deeds altogether and substitutes for the very desire and will to action 
a craving and need for insight into the laws of movement according 
to which the terror functions” (2005, pp. 348-349). This principle of 
movement is ideology, understood as the imperative coherence of a 
logical thinking that reduces reality as a whole to a single superhuman 
force capable of explaining all human events.
In fact, the notion of human freedom as irrelevant or subject 
to superhuman forces has become preponderant in modern political 
thought long before the rise of totalitarian regimes. Insofar as Nature 
or History are regarded as overwhelming forces that vanquish all 
human efforts, the belief in necessity renders any notion of freedom 
purely illusory. Hence, in the totalitarian claim to execute higher laws, 
the “Hegelian definition of Freedom as insight into and conforming 
to ‘necessity’ has […] found a new and terrifying realization” (2005, 
p. 346). The difficulties of philosophers to deal with freedom, and 
consequently with the faculty of willing, must be shown below. Before 
that, I would like to finish this section following some of Andreas 
Kalyvas’s arguments in order to stress Arendt’s ambiguity in the 
treatment of the will.
As we have seen, Arendt criticizes the will “for its solipsistic, 
silent, violent, anti-political, arbitrary, and unstable nature” (Kalyvas, 
2004, p. 326). But it is not a matter of refusing it altogether. In some 
of her writings, Arendt holds a place for the will: it concerns the 
experiences of a person within himself. In the essay on the nature of 
totalitarianism, for example, one reads that totalitarian ideologies find 
“a great and pertinent danger” in “the human freedom to change one’s 
mind” (Arendt, 2005, p. 351). In this sense, the will is a partner of 





The will becomes “dangerous and harmful”, according to 
Arendt’s critique of sovereignty, only insofar it is “introduced into 
politics in the form of monarchical, national, or popular will” (Kalyvas, 
2004, p. 326). Once again, thinking and willing are partners. Both 
can become tyrannical when they leave the inner life to be expressed 
in the common world.4 Then sovereignty “conjures up the practices 
of command and coercion, separating the ruler from the ruled”, 
and jeopardizing “the multiperspectival and plural nature of the 
public sphere by homogenizing and annihilating all differences and 
distinctions in the name of ‘One Man of gigantic proportions’” (2004, 
p. 326). Once it is seen as the suppression of conflicts, the sovereign 
will can also be regarded as the elimination of agonistic wills. 
In fact, Arendt describes totalitarianism as the effort to get rid 
of human will altogether. It is not only —and surely not primarily— 
the appetite or desire to satisfy personal interests that is at stake, but 
the will to act in a public-political sphere. “It is precisely this will to 
act that informs her notions of courage and heroism that correspond 
to her peculiar understanding of citizenship. To be a citizen entails 
a willingness to suffer the consequences of such a decision to leave 
one’s private hiding place and disclose or expose one’s self in front 
of one’s peer”. This “decision to act”, continues Kalyvas interpreting 
the excerpt of The Human Condition mentioned above, “seems to arise 
‘directly out of the will to live together with others in the mode of acting 
and speaking’ […] a decision that flows directly from the will and the 
inner self” (2004, p. 332; cf. Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 246).
Kalyvas is successful in collecting excerpts of Arendt’s writings 
in which she affirms the political relevance of the will. He is even more 
perspicacious in noting that the “will’s dual nature” shows up in the 
final chapter of Origins when she describes the terror of totalitarian 
regimes and the coercive force of its ideological deductions as two 
4 “This has been the professional risk of the philosopher, who, because of his quest for 
truth and his concern with questions we call metaphysical […] needs solitude […]. As the 
inherent risk of solitude, loneliness is, therefore, a professional danger for philosophers, 
which, incidentally, seems to be one of the reasons that philosophers cannot be trusted with 
politics or a political philosophy. […] [Their interest] to be left alone, to have their solitude 
guaranteed and freed from all possible disturbances […] has naturally led them to sympathize 
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different, yet related, menaces to the freedom of movement and to 
inner freedom, that is, to the political and non-political freedom. It 
may not seem accurate to identify this inner freedom with the faculty 
of will, as does Kalyvas, since in this context Arendt explicitly refers 
to thinking (cf. Kalyvas, 2004, pp. 333-334; Arendt, 1951/1985, p. 
473). Also in the essay on the nature of totalitarianism, she describes 
“spontaneity” as “the specifically human unpredictability of thought 
and action” (Arendt, 2005, p. 350). But this seeming misconception 
does not quash the argument. One can say, for example, that in the early 
fifties she had not yet distinguished the faculties of mind ―thinking, 
willing, and judging. Anyway, the strength of Kalyvas’s account lies in 
the duality between two kinds of freedom, one that is experienced in 
solitude and the other that is lived in public. And that is a problem to 
which Arendt returns over and over again.
The Philosophical Discovery of the Will
The duality between an inner freedom and the freedom experienced 
in the outer world receives a new formulation in one of her lectures 
given in 1960 and published one year later in Between Past and Future. 
Not by chance, it is titled with an eminently philosophical question: 
“What is Freedom?”. Here —and this is the key for my argument in this 
section— Arendt is approaching will in a very traditional way, even if 
her approach of freedom is quite unconventional.
She starts by presenting the traps found by those who ask about 
freedom. While our consciousness and conscience tell us that we are 
free and responsible for our decisions, every time we stop to think 
about our deeds, the principle of causality is imposed on us, that is, we 
feel that everything has a reason. So our practical, moral, and political 
assumptions on freedom are opposed to our theoretical endeavors. In 
other words, anyone can find a cause to the decision that was taken as 
if there were no motifs, that is, as if it was an absolutely free choice. 
In fact, no one could fail to find it, albeit we cannot really know all the 






In this ineluctable contradiction between practical freedom and 
theoretical non-freedom, it is not scientific theory, but “thought itself 
[…] that seems to dissolve freedom”. For even if nature itself is not 
ruled by the principle of causality, “it certainly is a category of the mind 
to bring order into all sensory data” (Arendt, 1961/2006, p. 143). Kant’s 
answer to this predicament is the distinction between a pure reason 
and a practical reason, the subject of knowledge and the free-willing 
agent, the understanding of reason as such and the dictate of the will. 
By detaching the freedom of human action from the necessary search 
for causes in thinking, his solution is able to lay down a moral law that 
has the same status as the natural laws. “But it does little to eliminate 
the greatest and most dangerous difficulty, namely, that thought itself 
[…] makes freedom disappear —quite apart from the fact that it must 
appear strange indeed that the faculty of the will whose essential activity 
consists in dictate and command should be the harborer of freedom” 
(1961/2006, p. 144).
The predicament of thought before freedom has important 
consequences to political philosophy. Since one could not talk about 
politics without referring to —or believing in— the human capacity 
to act freely, it seems that those who have thinking as their main 
activity are the less suitable to engage in such affairs. In fact, she 
states, philosophical tradition “has distorted, instead of clarifying, 
the very idea of freedom such as it is given in human experience by 
transposing it from its original field, the realm of politics and human 
affairs in general, to an inward domain, the will” (1961/2006, p. 144). 
It all began, according to Arendt’s history of the will, with the stoic 
experience of estrangement from the world of which Epictetus’s ideas 
would be the more representative. 
As slaves, despoiled of their own place in the world, those men 
lacked the ancient precondition for freedom and could not participate in 
the political realm. Hence, they turned the unknown experience of public 
freedom into an experience within one’s self whereby a man could be a 
slave and still be free.5 The reversal of Roman political categories such 
5 In fact, the denial of public freedom and the escape to inwardness —“whether in the form of 
an inner dialogue which, since Socrates, we call thinking, or in a conflict within myself, the 
inner strife between what I would and what I do”— is attributed to all philosophical tradition 
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as power, domination and property, which came to be understood in the 
intercourse of a man with himself, prove the derivative character of the 
notion of inner freedom. “Before it became an attribute of thought or a 
quality of the will, freedom was understood to be the free man’s status, 
which enabled him to move, to get away from home, to go out into the 
world and meet other people in deed and word” (1961/2006, p. 147).6 
Here, as in the excerpts of The Human Condition mentioned above, action 
is accompanied by courage. But it is noteworthy that this courage to leave 
the private life is not understood as the will to act. In this essay, action 
and freedom are not phenomena of the will at all. As a matter of fact, 
there is a link between action, the will, and the other faculties of mind. 
Yet it has nothing to do with freedom.
Action insofar as it is determined is guided by a future aim 
whose desirability the intellect has grasped before the will wills 
it, whereby the intellect calls upon the will, since only the will 
can dictate action [...]; to recognize the aim [of action] is not a 
matter of freedom, but of right or wrong judgment. Will, seen 
as a distinct and separate human faculty, follows judgment, i.e., 
cognition of the right aim, and then commands its execution. The 
power to command, to dictate action, is not a matter of freedom 
but a question of strength or weakness. (1961/2006, p. 150). 
Action, in this sense, is understood as a tool employed by the will 
on behalf of the intellect, whose goals are recognized as adequate by a 
precise judgment of the pertinent issues.7 Notwithstanding, according 
to Arendt’s theory, this is not a genuine sort of action. For her, as the 
possibility “to call something into being which did not exist before”, 
action must be free from motifs and goals, it should be “neither under 
the guidance of the intellect nor under the dictate of the will” (1961/2006, 
p. 150). So what boosts action? Arendt recalls her discussion of 
Montesquieu affirming that action “springs from something altogether 
different which [...] I shall call a principle”, and that “becomes fully 
6 The experience of thought in general would be secondary: “an intercourse between me 
and myself begins the moment the intercourse between me and my fellow men has been 
interrupted for no matter what reason” (Arendt, 2006, p. 157).
7 In The Life of the Mind she reverses it saying: “a will that is not free is a contradiction in terms 
—unless one understands the faculty of volition as mere auxiliary executive organ for whatever 





manifest only in the performing act itself” (1961/2006, pp. 150-151). 
Then, in a parallel between political and artistic concepts, she turns 
to one of her favorite political writers. Machiavelli’s concept of virtù is 
compared to the excellence of performing arts that found their end not 
in a product but in the performance itself, which requires the presence 
of an audience. These notions will be important in a contradistinction 
between sovereignty and virtuosity. But let us keep this aside for a while. 
Following her narrative in this essay, early Christianity is 
presented as the second great moment in the philosophical discovery 
of the will. Indeed, it is a crucial moment. Arendt goes so far as to say 
that Paul was the first to find out some non-political freedom, and 
that freedom as such had no space in philosophy prior to Augustine. 
So what is the difference between the notion of will derived from the 
stoic removal from the public-political world and the notion of will 
as conceived by Christianity? First, more than a conflict between an 
inner life and the outside world, or between reason and passion, two 
different faculties, what emerges is “a conflict within the will itself” 
(1961/2006, p. 157). Until then, the only duality within a faculty of the 
mind recognized by our tradition was the dialogue between me and 
myself, that is, the thinking dialogue. But this is not a conflict. On the 
contrary, one knows that is thinking well when one does not contradict 
oneself.8 Moreover, the dichotomy in willing does not set the self in 
motion as in thinking. Rather “it paralyzes and locks it within itself; 
willing in solitude is always velle and nolle, to will and not to will at the 
same time” (1961/2006, p. 157).
It is astonishing that the faculty that should be able to command 
and dictate action ends up stuck in a battle within itself, as if someone 
could disobey her/himself. This “monstrosity” is explained by the fact 
that the will is once again lived as an experience of impotence, as if the 
I-will were detached from the I-can. “Historically, men first discovered 
the will when they experienced its impotence and not its power, when 
they said with Paul: ‘For to will is present with me; but how to perform 
that which is good I find not” (1961/2006, p. 160).  This situation gives 
8 In The Life of the Mind, one reads that the possibility of the will to contradict itself is the 
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rise to the notion of will-to-power or, more precisely, that is why “will, 
will-power, and will-to-power are for us almost identical notions; the 
seat of power is to us the faculty of the will as known and experienced 
by man in his intercourse with himself” (1961/2006, p. 158). However, 
the Christian notion is distinguished from the stoic one inasmuch as 
the willing ego feels the impotence “within one’s self, in the ‘interior 
dwelling’ (interior domus), where Epictetus still believed man to be an 
absolute master” (1961/2006, p. 160).
Forbidden to do whatever it pleases, the I-will devotes itself to a 
destructive enterprise. In the vein of her analysis of imperialism qua 
origin of totalitarian regimes, Arendt describes the will-to-power as a 
will-to-oppression brought forth by an anti-political situation, where 
man is not only isolated from the others or at war with them, not only 
focused in his or her own interests and goals, but also captured by one’s 
own self. The I-will “remains subject to the self, strikes back at it, spurs 
it on, incites it further, or is ruined by it” (1961/2006, p. 161). The 
expansion of power —understood as the ability to acquire, possess, and 
accumulate more power— is unable to take someone beyond oneself. 
“However far the will-to-power may reach out, and even if somebody 
possessed by it begins to conquer the whole world, the I-will can never 
rid itself of the self; it always remains bond to it and, indeed, under its 
bondage” (1961/2006, p. 161).
This bondage to the self gives us the opportunity to come back 
to the problem of sovereignty, described in this essay as “the ideal of 
free will, independent from others and eventually prevailing against 
them”, just the opposite of virtuosity, where “men need the presence 
of others before whom they can appear” (1961/2006, pp. 152, 162). If 
my reading is correct, the one who wants to prevail against the others 
is at the same time subject to one’s own self, servant of oneself. Behind 
the idea of sovereignty lies the assumption that a political body must 
be almighty, unique, and indivisible as the self. Such a community 
would be built on quicksand, able to stand upright only through the 
constant use of violence. The steadiness of a political community, on 
the opposite, is achieved insofar as the political affairs are “transacted 
within an elaborate framework of ties and bonds” (1961/2006, p. 162) 





their words. These are not relations between sovereigns, but a relation 
of non-sovereignty.
In the last section of the essay on freedom, Arendt recalls the 
original Greek and Roman notions of action —archai and prattein; 
agere and gerere or res gestae— understood as a twofold and interrelated 
event, the beginning of something new and its collective achievement. 
We must keep this in mind henceforward in order to understand how 
the renounce of sovereignty —that is also the renounce of oneself— is 
articulated with the capacity to act, to start something new, to be free, 
and, furthermore, to the possibility of political conflicts.
The Spring of Action
In the introduction to the discussion on “Willing” in The Life of the Mind, 
Arendt presents a problem quite similar to the one that opens her essay 
on freedom, i.e., the dilemma of how to reconcile human freedom 
with the laws of causality, the imperatives of Nature and History, or 
the omniscience of an almighty God. But an important shift is already 
evident in the second page, when she affirms that the greatest difficulty 
in a discussion on will is the fact that this faculty had been “consistently 
doubted and refuted by so eminent a series of philosophers” (Arendt, 
1978, p. 4). Thus, the history of will written here, even if it enrolls 
the same characters ―Epictetus, Paul, Augustine, Scotus, Hobbes, 
Montesquieu, among others― is seen from another perspective. It is 
no longer a matter of attributing to the philosophical tradition the 
discovery of the will as a reversal of public freedom. Just the opposite, 
now she is saying that philosophers were unable to deal with the matter, 
and such inability comes up precisely from its “inevitable connection 
with Freedom” (1978, p. 5; see also p. 26). In a striking turnaround, she 
brings will and action near, naming the former as the “spring” of the 
latter, and asking “whether men of action were not perhaps in a better 
position to come to terms with the problems of the Will than the men 
of thought” (1978, p. 6). 
This section intends to show the late shifts in Arendt’s thought 
on will, focusing mainly in the anti-political aspects seen above: the 
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own self; its tendency to homogenize and to destroy all differences; 
and its command over the others as a sovereign, unprecedented, and 
unconstrained decision. The main assumption here is that Arendt is 
not denying that willing is experienced in inner life, just like thinking 
does, though this is not anymore —or not necessarily— home for a 
lonely and sovereign subject. Before showing that, I would like to briefly 
highlight the unavoidable prerequisite to Arendt’s politicization of the 
will: the rectilinear concept of time.
Time was not a topic in her earlier considerations on will, but 
it became crucial and takes up much of the first chapter in The Life of 
the Mind. Indeed, not the concept of time itself but the future tense, in 
which our words must be confirmed, is thematized in a passage of The 
Human Condition where promise is depicted as “the memory of will” 
(1958/1998, p. 245). In another sense, the will is now described as “our 
mental organ for the future” (1978, p. 13). In fact, though she did not 
spell it out, both promise and will deal with the future.9 Then, both deal 
with things that are absent, things that do not exist and may never come 
to being. In other words, they deal with contingency. The Greeks had 
an expression to what comes to being by accident: kata symbebekos. 
However they did not have a word for the will.10 This lacuna, Arendt 
argues, is in agreement with their circular concept of time. Just as the 
Hebrew-Christian credo of a divine beginning, and its corresponding 
rectilinear time concept, are in agreement with the notion of will.
So, Arendt says, it is striking that modern philosophy, with 
its notion of progress and an unprecedented faith in the future, is 
so suspicious of the will. Indeed, the same distrust is found whether 
in the early modern —or post-medieval— thought or in the most 
contemporaneous philosophers. From Hobbes to Heidegger, including 
Descartes, Spinoza, Schiller, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and others, 
nearly the same questions are found. How can the notion of a free will 
9 The link between will and promise is made clearer in a lecture given in 1966: “The broken 
will is the will exerted in solitude, not with respect to others. I give and take promises with 
others, no promise given only to myself is really binding” (Arendt, 1966, p. 024554).
10 Greeks knew the voluntary act, hekon, in which a man is in possession of his physical and 
mental capacities. It does not mean free choice. Arendt argues, in the seventh section of The 
Life of the Mind, that Aristotle’s proairesis, the preference between two possibilities, is a kind of 





be conceived? How could something had come to being at the same 
time that it could have been left undone? How can we live in a history 
that has no sense, no ultimate cause or goal? How can we bear the sheer 
contingency? The unanimous answer is: We cannot. 
The philosopher’s solution for this dilemma is always to submit 
freedom to the reign of necessity —which is the reign of thought insofar 
as it is always looking back in order to sort and know what came to pass. 
Actually, anything that happens becomes necessary, so to speak, merely 
because it happened. “In the perspective of memory, that is, looked 
at retrospectively, a freely performed act loses its air of contingency 
under the impact of now being an accomplished fact, of having become 
part and parcel of the reality in which we live. […] [The] act appears to 
us now in the guise of necessity” (1978, p. 30). The great model of this 
backward glance is Hegel’s philosophy of history.
In sum, Hegel tries to reconcile two opposite views on time, one 
that recalls the past and another that projects the future, the thinking 
ego and the willing ego; and does so by transforming the circle into 
a progressive line, in a sort of spiral concept of time. So the future is 
always determined to fulfill the past, that is, the future is the return 
to and overcoming of the past. One of the problems raised by Arendt 
to Hegel’s contribution to the understanding of the will, which is the 
problem that runs through all the book, is that its power of negation —
the possibility of saying ‘no’ to the present, transcending what is given 
in order to start something that did not exist before and that may not 
happen either— would be determined by the very existence of what is. 
The reason Hegel could construe the World-Historical 
movement in terms of an ascending line […] is to be found in his 
never-questioned assumption that the dialectical process itself 
starts from Being, takes Being for granted (in contradistinction 
to a Creation ex nihilo) in its march […]. The initial Being lends 
all further transitions their reality, their existential character, 
and prevents them from falling into the abyss of Not-Being. 
(1978, p. 50).
The preponderance of Being over Not-Being or Becoming is 
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aside. For now, it is important to note that in Arendt’s account a 
fundamental part of Hegel’s thought is also concerned with freedom 
and, consequently, with the willing ego relation towards the future. “The 
primacy of the past”, she says following Alexandre Koyré, “disappears 
entirely when Hegel comes to discuss Time”. More precisely, history 
finds its fulfillment in the future, and is by denying his present that 
man “creates his own future” (1978, pp. 40-41). Hence the auto-
production of man is for Hegel the auto-constitution of time, because 
man —as Augustine had also stated—11 is not only in time; man is time.
Without him there might be movement and motion, but there 
would not be Time. Nor could there be, if man’s mind were 
equipped only for thinking, for reflecting on the given, on what 
is as it is and could not be otherwise; in that case man would live 
mentally in an everlasting present. […] [The] mind produces time 
only by virtue of the will, its organ for the future. (1978, pp. 42-43).
By now it should be clear that the Will as an organ for the future is 
identical with the power of beginning something new. In this approach, 
one of its anti-political features is dismissed. The will is no longer 
experienced as the reversal of public freedom, the estrangement from 
the world, and a retreat to inwardness; rather it is concerned with 
the world. “The will always wills to do something” —while thinking 
“depends on ‘doing nothing’” (1978, p. 37). Thus, in clear contrast to 
her earlier considerations, there is a fundamental connection between 
willing and action.
The “impatience, disquiet, and worry” of the will are due to the fact 
that its “project presupposes an I-can that is by no means guaranteed. 
The will’s worrying disquiet can be stilled only by the I-can-and-I-do, 
that is, by a cessation of its own activity and release of the mind from its 
dominance” (1978, p. 37). The willing ego cannot save itself from the 
conflict between willy and nilly. It waits for a redemption that would 
come only through action. Nonetheless, there is no guarantee since “to 
11 “But what, then, was God’s purpose in creating man, asks Augustine; […] creating ‘temporal 
man [hominem temporalem] who has never before been’, that is, a creature that does not just 
live ‘in time’ but is essentially temporal, is, as it were, time’s essence. […] He then gives a very 
surprising answer […]. In order, he says, that there may be novelty, a beginning must exist; ‘and 





will and to be able to perform, velle and posse, are not the same. The 
tension can be overcome only by doing, that is, by giving up the mental 
activity altogether” (1978, p. 38). It depends, therefore, on a decision 
that takes the self out of oneself, throwing him or her in a common 
world where actions can be performed. A world shared by men. So, the 
will is no longer servant of the self. It does not unfold as will-to-power 
but in a will-to-act.
In spite of its need of redemption, willing is no longer an 
experience of impotence. The connection between willing and acting 
is “startling”, she says in a dialogue with Augustine, because the “‘Will 
must be present for power to be operative’; and power, needless to say, 
must be present for the will to draw on” (1978, p. 88). However, as in her 
treatment of other concepts, the connection is made by a distinction; it 
is a “contrasting bond” (Duarte, 2013, p. 51), the relationship between 
“things that are inseparable and yet distinct” (Arendt, 1978, p. 99). In 
this case, although related to the outer world, the “freedom of the Will” 
lies “exclusively on an inner power of affirmation or negation that has 
nothing to do with any actual posse or potestas —the faculty needed to 
perform the Will’s commands” (1978, p. 88). Hence, both against Paul 
and Epictetus, the will is neither impotent nor omnipotent. 
To be sure, while discussing Epictetus’ philosophy, the will seems 
to be nothing but sovereign; it is the “great achiever”, “the organ capable 
of command”. But in the stoic experience of this faculty, its power 
rests on its sovereign decision to concern itself only with things 
within man’s power, and these reside exclusively in human 
inwardness. […] [S]ince man, in other words, is entirely 
powerless in the real world, he has been given the miraculous 
faculties of reason and will that permit him to reproduce the 
outside […] inside his mind, where he is undisputed lord and 
master. (1978, p.78). 
Arendt does not merely corroborate this interpretation as true, but 
renders it problematic by assuming that “only when will power has 
reached this climactic point, where it can will what is and thus never 
be ‘at odds with outward things’, that it can be said to be omnipotent” 
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history, the will is conceived by men of thought along with the primacy 
of Being.12
But this is not the only safeguard of philosophers. Since willing 
is the experience of “an ongoing ‘struggle’ (agon)”, “a never-ending 
fight with the counter-will” in which man finds “himself as his own 
enemy”, sovereignty is achieved only by means of the reduction, 
destruction, or victory of one over another. This would be “the worst 
that, from the view-point of the thinking ego, could happen to the two-
in-one” (1978, pp. 82-83). Actually, to maintain the dialogue between 
me and myself requires not only the permanence of this duality, but 
also that both are in agreement. However, our experience of wanting 
something —which is different from craving or desiring— is always the 
experience of not wanting too. The will is always accompanied by the 
counter-will, indeed, by “various wills” (1978, p. 94). Thus our most 
contentious faculty “has an infinitely greater freedom than thinking, 
which even in its freest, most speculative form cannot escape the law of 
non-contradiction” (1978, p. 5). 
The “possibility of resistance” and the “power to disobey, […] 
to assent or dissent, say Yes or No […], agree or disagree with what 
is factually given […] regardless of necessity and compulsion”, its 
indifference and indeterminacy, summing up, the power to “transcend 
the very factuality of Being”, seems to be unbearable for men of thought 
(1978, pp. 27, 68, 83, 129-30).
This power must have had something awful, truly overpowering, 
for the human mind, for there has never been a philosopher or 
theologian who, after having paid due attention to the implied 
No in every Yes, did not squarely turn around and demand an 
emphatic consent, advising man, as Seneca did in a sentence 
quoted with great approbation by Master Eckhard, “to accept all 
occurrences as though he himself had desired them and asked 
for them”. (1978, p. 83).
12 For Epictetus, Arendt argues, “it is impossible that what happens should be other than it is 
[…] because even an absolute negation depends on the sheer inexplicable thereness of all that 
is, including myself […]. Hence, as Augustine will later argue, those who believe they choose 
non-being when they commit suicide are in error; they choose a form of being that will come 






What is unbearable to the philosophical need for unity and 
coherence is the very possibility of conflict, dissent, disobedience, 
and disagreement. That is precisely the reason why Arendt criticizes 
the tradition of political thought. By now it should be clear that what is 
anti-political in the faculties of the mind is the illusion of a solipsistic 
self, and its consequence is the onslaught of a philosopher-king, a 
sovereign will, or a supreme judge over the public-political sphere. 
On the contrary, when the faculties of mind are considered as close 
to action, consistent with the plurality of public-political life, they 
are understood as experiences of a multiple self. A multiplicity that 
could not be reduced to one single subject, in the same way that human 
plurality could not be reduced to one single man.
To be sure, the multiplicity of human condition does not concern 
only the experience of the agonistic will. The self is partitioned in its 
several faculties. It is split not only between the vita activa and the 
vita contemplativa, for, as she argues in The Human Condition, the very 
activities are distinguished as well as the faculties of mind. There is 
no precedence in these fragmented capacities. The self, in the words 
of Bonnie Honig, “is the site of several struggles”, the “subject as 
multiplicity […], a plurality whose parties, in the absence of any 
hierarchical ordering, often engage in a struggle for dominion” (Honig, 
1993, pp. 82-83). Notwithstanding, in The Life of the Mind one of these 
faculties is in charge of gathering all of them. But before discussing the 
“Will’s binding force” (Arendt, 1978, p. 100), it should be made clear 
that one among the three anti-political tendencies of the will seems 
to be unsolved so far. If my reading is correct, there still remains the 
problem of a sovereign decision.  
In order to better understand this crucial question, it can be 
helpful to go back a few pages and quote her summary of the discussion 
on Augustine. I would like to suggest that we could read this having in 
mind an analogy with the public and political world.
First: The split within the Will is a conflict, and not a dialogue,13 
and it is independent of the content that is willed. A bad will is no 
less split than a good one and vice versa. Second: The will as the 
13 In the sense of a dialectical conversation between two-in-one that must come to an 
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commander of the body is no more than an executive organ of the 
mind and as such quite unproblematic. The body obeys the mind 
because it is possessed of no organ that would make disobedience 
possible. The will, addressing itself to itself, arouses the counter-
will because the exchange is entirely mental; a contest is possible 
only between equals. A will that would be ‘entire’, without a 
counter-will, could no longer be a will properly speaking. Third: 
Since it is in the nature of the will to command and demand 
obedience, it is also in the nature of the will to be resisted. Finally: 
Within the framework of the Confessions, no solution to the riddle 
of this “monstrous” faculty is given; how the will, divided against 
itself, finally reaches the moment when it becomes “entire” 
remains a mystery. (Arendt, 1976, pp. 95-96).
Such a decision seems to come out of nowhere, based on nothing, 
and guided by no rule. It seems to be, in an expression recurrent in 
contemporary political theory, an exceptional decision. Actually, 
while Arendt discusses the consequences that Duns Scotus draws 
from Augustine, a similar political concept comes into play along 
with a theological one. The “redemption14 comes from the act which 
—often like a coup d’état, in Bergson’s felicitous phrase— interrupts the 
conflict between velle and nolle” (Arendt, 1978, p. 101). Are we then, 
at the end of this whole journey, faced with an arbitrary decision? No 
other solution is given by Augustine, she says, “except at the very end of 
the Confessions, when he suddenly begins to speak of the Will as a kind 
of Love, ‘the weight of our soul’”(1978, pp. 95-96).15
14 This redemption, according to Augustine, could not come through divine grace. Arendt 
argues jocosely that it would be “difficult to imagine God’s gratuitous grace deciding whether I 
should go to the theater or commit adultery” (Arendt, 1978, p. 97).
15 Here, I would like to situate my reading between Honig’s account, according to which The 
Life of the Mind does not represents a substantial change in the Arendtian corpus, and Kalyvas’ 
argument on the “abrupt shift” in her latter work. According to Kalyvas, in her “confusing” 
and “self-defeating” account, Arendt “fails […] to link her own penetrating observations on 
the will to action and political freedom and to place them within a coherent and systematic 
framework” (Kalyvas, 2004, p. 338). Such an effort would be able to untie theoretical knots 
within her work, including the relationship between liberation and freedom. “If, however, 
we take seriously her re-definition of the will […], would it not be legitimate to suggest that 
the genuine political decision […] could [not only be thought as liberation from oppression, 
therefore a pre-political condition, but] also be re-conceptualized as a faculty to collectively 





The insight comes from Augustine’s treatise on the mystery of 
Christian trinity. “Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three substances when 
each is related to itself, can at the same time form a One”. This is a 
relationship among equals. And since man was created in the image of 
God, also in us there should be a relationship like this. Augustine finds 
it in the human mind. He distinguishes between Intellect, Memory, and 
Will, which are mutually related to each other. “These three faculties 
are equal in rank, but their Oneness is due to the Will” (1978, p. 99). 
For it is the Will who tells what should be understood and remembered, 
putting those capacities together. It does so calling our attention, and 
since its force “unites the mind’s inwardness with the outward world”, 
the will can be called “the spring of action” (1978, p. 101).
Conclusion: The Act of Love
This research intends to show an undeniable ambiguity in Arendt’s 
treatment of the will along her work. I understand this ambiguity as 
follows. On the one hand, she takes on the philosophical discourse 
about the inwardness of the will —even though she does so by refusing 
sum, the reappraisal of the will could bridge the gap between these two notions of liberty. By 
doing so, he intends to elaborate a theory of decision consistent with democratic forms of 
deliberation.In fact, Honig does admit that “the will in LOM is not consistent with her earlier 
account”, stating however that these moments are “marked by important continuities, in light 
of which the shift in her view turns out to be of limited import”  (Honig, 1988, p. 79). The 
crucial difference in relation to Kalyvas’ view concerns the possibility to bridge the gap between 
liberation and freedom. “Here, as elsewhere, Arendt’s account of inner life parallels her 
political theory. Just as liberation from necessity sets the stage for the constitution of freedom 
in the political world, so the liberation from the private self, won by the will’s coup d’état, sets 
the condition for the appearance of the acting self whose action makes freedom manifest in the 
human world. But willing itself is neither free nor unfree in Arendt’s strict sense. And there is 
no overlap between liberation and freedom, between willing and acting” (Honig, 1998, p. 80). 
It is startling such an effort to keep the frontiers between the inner and outer life, coming from 
an author who insists so enthusiastically in occupy and resist to Arendt’s “nonnegotiable” and 
“uncompromising public-private distinction” (Honig, 1993, p. 118). And it seems to me that 
one does not find in The Life of the Mind a “rigorously dismissive approach to the inner life of 
the self” (Honig, 1988, p. 78). Action not only “happens” to the “subject in the private realm” 
(Honig, 1993, p. 120). If so, we could not say that “the inner plurality of the self is the source of 
its vigor”, the “spur to action” (Honig, 1993, p. 117). However, I agree with her insistence on 
the abyss between willing and acting, or at least, with the assumption that is not so easy to cross 
this bridge: “there is a hiatus marked by contingency ―for a moment everything is uncertain” 
(Honig, 1993, p. 80). It seems to me that what is absent in both Kalyvas’ and Honig’s account is 
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the anti-political idea of an inner freedom. On the other hand, the will 
acquires a political scope when she wonders whether political actors 
would not be more able to understand this faculty.
What is anti-political in the faculties of the mind is the illusion of 
a solipsistic self. Contrariwise, the connection between will and action 
—in which the former is thought as the “spring” of the latter, therefore 
consistent with the plurality of the public-political world— depends 
on the partition of human faculties. In fact, the human condition as a 
whole is understood as the experience of a multiple and conflictive self. 
However, the problem does persist of how these several faculties are 
brought together; how someone stops thinking or willing and starts to 
act; in which direction a conflict between desires and moral statements, 
or between a personal dream and an obligation is solved. Moreover, how 
can the willing ego decide the direction of our attention while it is stuck 
in a lasting battle within itself? Its redemption, as we saw above, comes 
from action; but action, paradoxically, springs from the will.  In other 
words, in the battle that each one of us brings inside ourselves, there 
remains the problem of how decisions are made. As I have suggested, the 
same could be thought analogously about collective decisions.
The solution “comes about through a transformation of the 
Will itself, its transformation into Love”; which is “obviously the most 
successful coupling agent”. Love attracts, binds, and holds things 
together. Unlike the will itself, which finds its end in the achievement 
of what was willed, love “enables the mind ‘to remain steadfast in order 
to enjoy’ it”. As anyone in love knows, “the whole mind ‘is in those 
things upon which it thinks with love’” (1978, pp. 102-103). There is 
a sense of permanence that is not the absolute stillness, the end of a 
movement, the absolute quietness of death. Love keeps moving. Still, it 
calls our attention; it makes us stand without paralyzing us. Love forces 
us to persist.
Hence the will transformed into love not only unifies the 
multiple self as also creates, so to speak, an “enduring I”.16 In the words 
16 This “enduring I” can thus be held accountable for his/her actions. According to Bethania 
Assy, these two occurrences are the main outcomes of the relationship between the will and 
action: “the will can be regarded as action’s mental parallel that achieves our singularity 






of John Stuart Mill quoted by Arendt: “[…] it is obvious that ‘I’ am both 
parties in the contest; the conflict is between me and myself. […] What 
causes Me, or, if you please, my Will, to be identified with one side 
rather than with the other, is that one of the Me’s represents a more 
permanent state of my feelings than the other does” (1978, p. 96). The 
continuous confirmation or reiteration of my acts gives shape to my 
personality. The willing, insofar as it becomes love, “creates the self’s 
character and therefore was sometimes understood as the principium 
individuationis, the source of the person’s specific identify” (1978, p. 
195). It is the “soul’s gravity” (1978, p. 104), the ‘weight’ that stabilizes 
us like the ballast of a ship.
Then, Arendt's reappraisal of the will as consistent with political 
action removes its arbitrary and violent aspect through what she calls 
the transformation of will into love —besides an appeal to the faculty 
of judgment, which remained unexplored in the limits of this paper. 
It is worthy to recall that the concept of love, which also deserves 
a discussion about its different meanings throughout her work, is 
related to another important concept in Arendt’s political thought: 
the Amor mundi. As Bethânia Assy asserts, “Amor mundi is the love for 
what is created through action in concert, the love that renders durable 
the inventions of political freedom, as also provides a stable reality to 
future generations” (Assy, 2002, p. 51).17
In concluding, it does not seem an overstatement saying that 
Arendt’s account on willing shed a different light on her political 
theory. Most importantly, though it cannot be easily transposed 
into a theory of democratic deliberation, I believe it could also give 
us a key to think the current political conflicts in our societies, and 
outline an understanding of how decisions are —or could be made in 
our public-political reality. In this sense, it is important to highlight 
her critique of the sovereign will as the renounce of one’s own self, 
17 It would be interesting to compare Arendt’s concept of love and the one presented in the 
work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Departing from the notion of constituent power 
as a sovereign and exceptional act, they claim it as an “act of love”. The time has come for a 
rupture, they proclaim in a sort of prophetic voice that is not so far from Arendt’s détournement 
of theological concepts. The moment of this rupture is the “sudden expression of Kairós”, “the 
moment in which a decision to act is taken”. The event that will lead us to this moment will be 
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the acknowledgement of a multiple self. Political arrangements are 
not made by a single man or an identical collective, it is not achieved 
in the intercourse with one’s self but precisely in the abandonment 
of oneself, that is, when someone leaves the private sphere, the deep 
background of his heart and mind, in order to be exposed in public, 
to be lost among the others, and finally find in there a self who was 
unknown, and could not show up in loneliness. 
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